BSCR Firm News/Blogs Feedhttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10en-us06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 -0800firmwisehttps://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rssNo Notice, No Constructive Discharge: Lessons from Pronkhttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146974&format=xml23 Oct 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: An employee&rsquo;s failure to avail himself of his employer&rsquo;s established procedures for investigating and addressing claims of discrimination may undermine his claims that he was constructively discharged or otherwise discriminated against.</p> <div> <p>The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upholds an Employer&rsquo;s Motion for Summary Judgment where the employee brought claims for age discrimination, equal protection violations, due process violations, and civil conspiracy pursuant to &sect; 1983. A male employee with a supervisory administrative role with the city fire department retired after a position reclassification, reduction in duties and reduction in pay. He alleged objectively intolerable working conditions which led to his constructive discharge.</p> <p>In <i><a href="https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/10/251327P.pdf">Pronk v. City of Rochester</a></i>, a plaintiff employee of the Rochester Fire Department worked there from 2011 to 2021. In 2017, after successful performance reviews, Pronk was promoted and given supervisory duties over other administrative employees. In 2021, the Fire Chief completed a strategic plan analysis of the Rochester Fire Department where Pronk&rsquo;s performance revealed he lacked the ability and desire to lead the administrative team. Pronk also displayed unsatisfactory management of the budget, maintenance, and IT issues. The fire department provided this feedback in Pronk&rsquo;s 2020 and 2021 performance reviews and decided to reclassify him to a non-supervisory role with reduced pay and responsibilities.</p> <p>The District Court granted summary judgment to the Rochester Fire Department and dismissed all claims. It held that Pronk failed to show objectively intolerable working conditions because &ldquo;criticism of Pronk&rsquo;s work, removal of supervisory duties, and reduction in pay&rdquo; were insufficient on their own. Pronk also failed to establish an intent to discharge. His argument was &ldquo;speculative&rdquo; because &ldquo;the record lacked any evidence that the Employer intended for Pronk to retire.&rdquo; In addition, he did not give the fire department a reasonable opportunity to address his discrimination allegations. Finally, although the CBA gave Pronk a property interest in his job, the Court concluded that &ldquo;any procedural due process claims were waived because Pronk retired and refused to participate in post-termination or grievance procedures.&rdquo;</p> <p><b><u>Main Takeaways: The Employer provided ample remedies to address employee performance.</u></b></p> <ol> <li>The 8th Circuit has consistently held that an employee who quits without giving the employer a reasonable chance to resolve a problem has not been constructively discharged.</li> <li>Here, when Pronk&rsquo;s performance did not sufficiently improve after deficiencies were brought to his attention, the fire department redesigned his role instead of terminating his employment; they asked for the plaintiff&rsquo;s input and included him in the process of job reclassification.</li> <li>Redesigning his role instead of terminating employment shows intent by the fire department to maintain an employment relationship, not end it.</li> <li>The fire department conducted an alternate performance review in 2020, so that the plaintiff could still receive his merit-based increase.</li> <li>Although the fire department did not strictly adhere to all the terms of the CBA reclassification policy, the department&rsquo;s actions showed that they wanted to keep the plaintiff employed, and there was no evidence of discriminatory intent or pretext.</li> <li>Although the employer could have followed additional remedial measures, disagreements with management do not, without more, establish objectively intolerable working conditions, particularly when the employer&rsquo;s actions are supported by a factual basis, such as coworker complaints.</li> </ol> <p><b><u>Conclusion: The decision offers</u></b><b><u> employers a framework for addressing</u></b><b><u> performance concerns</u></b><b><u> and countering </u></b><b><u>constructive-</u></b><b><u>discharge claims.</u></b></p> <i>Pronk</i> highlights that an employee must provide a reasonable opportunity to allow the employer to address claims of discrimination as they relate to ADEA, MHRA, and the &sect; 1983 Equal Protection Clause. In addition, Pronk&rsquo;s CBA stated &ldquo;[e]mployees shall not be terminated except for just cause.&rdquo; As the District Court recognized, this gave him a protected property interest in his continued employment. However, he failed to show that the fire department deprived him of that property interest because he voluntarily retired. Pronk also failed to use the available CBA grievance procedures, to which a plaintiff cannot complain of a violation of procedural due process when he has not availed himself of existing procedures. Lastly, there is not a &sect; 1983 violation without an underlying constitutional violation.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Washington's Personnel-File Law: What Employers Should Consider in Light of SHB 1308https://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146936&format=xml14 Oct 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: 2025 revisions to Washington&rsquo;s personnel-file law may increase exposure for employers, raising as many new questions as the changes may have attempted to answer. A prompt and holistic response will go a long way in mitigating any potential disputes.</p> <div> <p>In 2025, Washington made some significant changes to its personnel-file law through Substitute House Bill 1308 which all Washington employers and their insurers should be aware of. The new law, which took effect July 27, 2025, gives current and former employers a clearer right to obtain their personnel files and generally requires private employers to provide those records within 21 calendar days of a request. It also requires employers to provide certain information about a former employee&rsquo;s discharge. Perhaps most significant is that employees now have a private right of action under this new law, which allows recovery of statutory damages, attorney fees, costs, and equitable relief when an employer fails to comply. Though the statute is now more than a year old, it has been reported that not all employers have updated their practices.</p> <p>One of the biggest changes under the new personnel-file law is that missing the deadline can now cost employers financially. RCW 49.12.261 allows employees to bring a lawsuit and recover statutory damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The penalties are assessed in increasing fashion, from $250 after 21 days, to $500 after 28 days, and up to $1,000 when production is more than 35 days late. The law&rsquo;s attorney fee provision is particularly important because it can provide employees an incentive to pursue even a relatively small personnel file dispute. Before filing suit, however, the employee must give the employer notice of an intent to sue, and a lawsuit for failure to provide a complete file cannot be filed until five calendar days after that notice. Employers should treat such notice as a final opportunity to investigate the request and, if necessary, fix any problems before they turn into litigation. Self-insurers in Washington should note that when personnel files are requested in the context of workers&rsquo; compensation litigation, such a failure could be used as evidence supporting decertification of self-insured status under RCW 51.14.080.</p> <p>While the changes add penalties, we also now have clarification on what exactly is contained within a &ldquo;personnel file.&rdquo; <a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=49.12.240">RCW 49.12.240</a>(2) defines personnel file to include all job application records, performance evaluations, nonactive or closed disciplinary records, leave and reasonable accommodation requests, payroll records, and employment agreements. Notably, this is an exclusive list: no other documents are considered part of the personnel file for these purposes. Although &ldquo;personnel file&rdquo; is now defined, the categories of documents used to define &ldquo;personnel file&rdquo; are not further defined within the statute. The Washington Department of Labor and Industries has begun clarifying the meaning of some of these terms, however. In an <a href="https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/law/wsr/2026/19/26-19-115.htm">amendment</a> to its personnel-file rule, WAC 296-126-050, set to be effective October 23, 2026, the Department has defined &ldquo;payroll records&rdquo; to include &ldquo;records required by WAC 296-128-010 through 296-128-030 for employers subject to the Minimum Wage Act.&rdquo; Such records include the employee&rsquo;s, name, address, hours worked, and wages paid each pay period.</p> <p>An employer is not required to create any records or retain records beyond the employer&rsquo;s usual or otherwise required retention policy (ordinarily three years for payroll records), and an employer need only produce an employee&rsquo;s personnel file once a year.</p> <p>For former employees, an employer may also need to provide &ldquo;a signed written statement to the former employee or their designee stating the effective date of discharge, whether the employer had a reason for the discharge, and if so, the reasons.&rdquo; Whether this statement need only be provided when a separate request for the statement is made or whether the statement must be provided any time a personnel file is requested by a former employee is up for debate. Guidance from the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries says that a statement regarding discharge must be made in conjunction with any request for a personnel file. The statute itself says, however, that an employer must provide such a statement after &ldquo;receiving a written request from a former employee or their designee,&rdquo; which suggests that the request for a statement must be explicit. The requirement to provide a statement is also listed separately from the requirement to provide an employee&rsquo;s personnel file, suggesting that the request is separate from a request for the personnel file. With this tension between the statutory language and the Department&rsquo;s guidance, it may be advisable to provide a written statement whenever a request for personnel file is made by a separated employee. However, there is an argument to be made based on the statutory text that providing the statement is only required when a direct request for the statement is made.</p> <p>There is also some ambiguity in who must sign the written statement. Must the employer itself sign the statement, or may the statement be provided and signed by the employer&rsquo;s attorney? The law does not explicitly require the employer to sign the statement, but the statement must be the employer&rsquo;s. A conservative approach would be to obtain the employer&rsquo;s signature on the statement.</p> <p>For employers wishing to get ahead of a request, reviewing current record organization and filing practices to align with the law would be ideal. For example, ensuring that personnel files for employees include the categories within the definition, to the extent such documents are kept to begin with. For employers who have received a request and have not already organized their files to facilitate a quick response, it will be crucial to begin working on a response as soon as the request is received, since 21 days is a short clock. It may be best not to overproduce so as to retain a clean file that is compliant with the law but without unnecessary documents in order to reduce chances of further liability.</p> Although questions remain about the ins and outs of Washington&rsquo;s personnel-file law, a prompt and holistic response from an employer that addresses the categories of documents within the definition of &ldquo;personnel file&rdquo; will go a long way in assuaging any further disputes over production of the file.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Using AI in your hiring decisions? Are you doing it right?https://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146833&format=xml21 Sep 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: Illinois enacts another statute regulating the use of Artificial Intelligence, which impacts employers&rsquo; hiring, promotion, and discharge decisions.</p> <div> <p>Illinois legislators strike again, this time limiting how employers may utilize AI in their employment decisions. An <a href="https://www.ilga.gov/Documents/Legislation/PublicActs/103/PDF/103-0804.pdf"><span style="color: rgb(204, 0, 0);">amendment</span></a> to the Illinois Human Rights Act, which took effect January 1, 2026: (1) specifically prohibits employers from using zip codes as a proxy for protected classes when screening job candidates, and (2) requires that the use of AI in employment decisions be disclosed to employees, where the use could have the effect of subjecting employees to discrimination on the basis of protected classes, as determined by the Illinois Department of Human Rights (&ldquo;IDHR&rdquo;). The Amendment identifies &ldquo;recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure, or the terms, privileges, or conditions of employment&rdquo; as specific employer decisions where the use of AI must be disclosed.</p> <p>This Amendment also further supports Illinois&rsquo; trend towards laws that regulate workplace technology. Illinois also has established the Biometric Information Privacy Act (&ldquo;BIPA&rdquo;), which places very strict regulations on how entities collect, use and store personal biometric data, including fingerprints, iris and face scans. In 2019, Illinois enacted the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act (&ldquo;AIVIA&rdquo;) which required employers to provide advance notice to applicants of its use of AI-enabled video interviewing technology, including notice of how the AI works, what characteristics are evaluated and required consent to be obtained before its use during interviews.</p> <p>Through the Amendment&rsquo;s definitions of both AI and Generative AI, the law&rsquo;s reach may be broader than it appears at first blush. AI is defined as a &ldquo;machine-based system&rdquo; that infers from the input how to generate outputs &ldquo;such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.&rdquo; Generative AI is defined by the Amendment as an &ldquo;automated computing system that when prompted with human prompts, descriptions, or queries, can produce outputs that simulate human-produced content.&rdquo; The Generative AI definition then provides examples of outputs, which are wholly unrelated to employer decisions:</p> <p>(1) textual outputs, such as short answers, essays, poetry, or longer compositions or answers;</p> <p>(2) image outputs, such as fine art, photographs, conceptual art, diagrams, and other images;</p> <p>(3) multimedia outputs, such as audio or video in the form of compositions, songs, or short-form or long-form audio or video; and</p> <p>(4) other content that would be otherwise produced by human means.</p> <p>What does this mean for employers? Employers should review hiring, promotion, discipline and training decision processes to identify any use of AI in those decisions. If AI is being utilized at any point, a disclosure must be made to every employee impacted by those decisions. Since the Amendment came into effect on January 1, 2026, employers may already be behind and need to quickly assess which decision processes may implicate the Amendment to ensure compliance. If an employee believes that the use of AI has subjected her to discrimination under the Amendment, she has the same right to pursue remedies as with any other claim of employment discrimination.</p> Although IDHR published proposed rules to implement the amendments on May 15, 2026, several weeks later, without explanation, it announced that the proposed rules had been temporarily postponed. The proposed rules were focused on clarifying the required notice and record keeping requirements under the Amendment. Employers should also continue to monitor the Amendment on the IDHR website for updates because as IDHR develops rules, employers may be required to take certain additional steps to satisfy the requirements of the Amendment. In the meantime, employers must comply with the statute, as amended, even without additional clarification.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Eighth Circuit Upholds ADA Direct Threat Defense for Safety-Sensitive Positionhttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146785&format=xml09 Sep 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: The Americans with Disabilities Act recognizes a &ldquo;direct threat&rdquo; defense to disparate treatment claims, where an employer can establish that the employee poses &ldquo;a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.&rdquo; In <i>Christensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.</i>, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment finding that Union Pacific established its direct threat defense because its fitness-for-duty restriction was based on a proper individualized assessment, was objectively reasonable, and relied on the best available objective medical evidence.</p> <div> <p>Ross Christensen had worked as a conductor for Union Pacific for more than ten years when he suffered an ischemic stroke at home in 2015. Within days, most of Christensen&rsquo;s symptoms had resolved, and his treating neurologist cleared him to return to work less than two months later.</p> <p>Before returning to work, Union Pacific required Christensen to submit to a medical fitness-for-duty evaluation. Two Union Pacific physicians reviewed Christensen&rsquo;s medical records and concluded he would need at least one year of sudden-incapacitation restrictions, prohibiting him from operating company vehicles and machinery and preventing him from working as a conductor while the restrictions remained in place. Christensen did not challenge the reasonableness of the initial one-year minimum restriction. Union Pacific granted Christensen medical leave of absence, but over that time, Union Pacific changed its practice based on updated scientific information about the frequence of seizures after strokes and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) guidance that commercial drivers who had suffered a cortical stroke and/or intracerebral hemorrhage should be prohibited from driving commercial vehicles for at least five years.</p> <p>Christensen never returned to work as a conductor and brought a disparate-treatment claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against Union Pacific.</p> <p><b>Background Law</b></p> <p>To establish an employer's liability on an ADA disparate treatment claim a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA, (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.</p> <p>But the statute recognizes a &ldquo;direct threat&rdquo; defense to disparate treatment claims, where the employer can demonstrate that the employee poses &ldquo;a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.&rdquo; 42 U.S.C.S. &sect; 12111(3). To establish the defense, the employer must show its decision that the employee posed a direct threat was: (1) the result of an individualized assessment, (2) objectively reasonable, and (3) based on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. The individualized assessment must also consider: (1) the duration of risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. 29 C.F.R. &sect; 1630.2(r).</p> <p><b>Arguments and Holdings</b></p> <p>The District Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Union Pacific, noting that although the likelihood of a seizure may have been relatively low, by its nature, that threat is always imminent, and the nature and severity of the potential harm was extreme. The District Court further noted that that the direct-threat defense strikes a delicate balance between the important goal of prohibiting discrimination and the need to protect others from significant risk, and that in this case, Union Pacific would have to expose itself to substantial tort liability in the future to avoid an ADA claim being brought against it here.</p> <p>Christensen appealed arguing that a jury could find Union Pacific failed to conduct an individualized assessment plan based on its reliance on the FMCSA guidelines, contending that reliance on the guidelines was not objectively reasonable, pointing to the fact that his personal physicians had cleared him.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court&rsquo;s Order granting Summary Judgment, finding that all the elements of direct threat were met in this case: The assessment included multiple rounds of fitness-for-duty evaluations that involved comprehensive review of Christensen's medical records, his condition, and his job duties. Union Pacific relied on the opinions of multiple physicians and on an extensive medical record in reaching its decision. And its decision was objectively reasonable in that Union Pacific acted on the most current medical knowledge and on the best available objective evidence, based on the FMCSA's guidelines.</p> <p><b>Takeaways regarding the Direct Threat Affirmative Defense.</b></p> <ol start="1" type="1"> <li><b>Elements: </b>In order to establish the Direct Threat affirmative defense against disparate treatment claims an employer must establish: 1) the work at issue is a safety-sensitive position that poses a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, 2) the decision to impose restrictions was based on an individualized assessment that considers the duration, nature, severity, likelihood, and imminence of the potential harm, 3) the decision was objectively reasonable, and 4) the restrictions are based on current medical knowledge or the best available objective evidence.</li> <li><b>Deference to Employer Physicians:</b> Employers can rely on the assessments of their own evaluating physicians over the conflicting opinions of an employee&rsquo;s treating physicians, provided the employer's physicians conduct a comprehensive review of the medical records and job duties. To overcome summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot merely rely on conflicting medical opinions but must present affirmative expert testimony establishing that the employer's medical determination was objectively unreasonable.</li> <li><b>Permissible Use of External Safety Guidelines</b>: Employers may utilize established external safety frameworks, such as the FMCSA guidelines, to measure risks in safety-sensitive positions. Utilizing these guidelines does not invalidate a legally required individualized assessment, where the employer has reviewed the employee's medical files and determined that the guidelines apply.</li> <li><b>Application favors protecting others from significant risk: </b>Employers are not liable under the ADA for making cautious or conservative medical judgments regarding direct threat, as long as those judgments are objectively reasonable and based on individualized, evidence-based assessments.</li> </ol> </div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10How does the EEOC's proposal to remove EEO-1 reporting impact employers?https://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146755&format=xml01 Sep 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: On July 21, 2026, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a Notice of Public Rule Making to remove EEO-1 and related reporting requirements, as well as the majority of related recordkeeping obligations, in a move that supports the current administration&rsquo;s efforts to deprioritize disparate impact enforcement.</p> <div> <p>On July 21, 2026, the EEOC voted 2-1 to issue a Notice of Public Rule Making proposing to remove form EEO-1 reporting and related recordkeeping requirements. <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/23/2026-14937/removal-of-reporting-requirements">Federal Register :: Removal of Reporting Requirements</a> Form EEO-1 is the annual form the EEOC has used since 1966 to collect race and sex demographic data from employers with over 100 employees and federal contractors with 50+ employees. Forms EEO-2 (labor-management committees that control apprenticeship programs), EEO-3 (labor organizations), EEO-4 (state and local governments), EEO-5 (elementary and secondary school systems), and EEO-6 (higher education) are also on the chopping block.</p> <p>Note, however, that the EEOC has not historically required submission of EEO-2 or EE0-6 for many years now, so the removal of those forms is of modest impact The rule also falls short of proposing removing all recordkeeping requirements of employment actions generally, and it cannot remove the apprenticeship recordkeeping requirement, codified at 29 CFR Part 1602.2, which is a requirement of Section 709(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.</p> <p>The EEOC&rsquo;s legal argument for abrogating longstanding EEO-1 practices is that regulations concerning race must pass strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, meaning use of the EEO-1 reporting form must be narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest. The EEOC has articulated a concern that the current reporting schematic, in effect for 60 years, is unconstitutional because collecting the demographic data could foster improper decision-making based on protected characteristics and imposes substantial costs on employers and the Commission. This rationale comes on the heels of last year&rsquo;s Supreme Court ruling in <i>Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services</i> that did away with a heightened burden-of-proof analysis for reverse racism cases.</p> <p>In support of the proposal, the EEOC asserts that the Commission may continue to request the same demographic information as needed in conjunction with their active investigations, without needing to otherwise collect the data via EEO-1 forms. While the EEOC did not elaborate on its analysis of the lower &ldquo;intermediate scrutiny&rdquo; burden to prove constitutionality for the EEO-1 collection of sex demographics, it assumed the current EEO-1 reporting also would not be substantially related to meeting an important government objective.</p> <p>On August 11, 2026, the Commission held a public hearing to receive oral comments on the proposal, and the written comment period closed August 24, 2026. A recording of the public hearing is available at the EEOC&rsquo;s website at the following link: <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/meetings/notice-commission-hearing-August-11">Meeting of August 11, 2026 | U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission</a>. Most importantly for employers, there is no new rule yet, so employers should continue to abide by their required reporting obligations until further notice.</p> <p>However, employers may be wondering&mdash;what is the practical impact on their business if and when the rule does go into effect?</p> <p><b><u>Navigating Demographic Data in the Current Landscape</u></b></p> <p>To collect or not to collect the data? That is the question. Once the EEOC&rsquo;s rulemaking goes into effect, employers may no longer be required by the EEOC to report their data, but the EEOC has made it clear they may still ask for it in the context of a pending investigation. At some point or another, an employer may be asked to provide the data, and discrimination claims may independently trigger such a preservation obligation, so employers should be discussing with their counsel how best to preserve this data in the most legally beneficial and defensible matter.</p> <p>&nbsp;As many employers know, demographic data can be very helpful in the defense of employment litigation. Now, however, it might very well be used against an employer to suggest that hiring criteria improperly took into consideration protected status in violation of Title VII. &nbsp;Likewise, while the EEOC is deprioritizing its own enforcement of disparate impact Title VII cases, the administrative agenda offers little comfort for employers as courtroom litigants. Whether or not the EEOC takes on a case usually has no impact on a Claimants receiving their &ldquo;Right to Sue&rdquo; notices, and case law remains plentiful to supports such claims. In short, employers must be mindful of both the EEOC&rsquo;s enforcement agenda and the enduring law decided in courtrooms.</p> So, what is an employer to do? One strategic approach to navigating these concerns may be to utilize legal counsel as the repository and shepherd of demographic data so that those with decision making authority are not directly privy to the company&rsquo;s demographic composition during the hiring/decision making process. Adding this layer of separation between hiring managers and demographic data may allow such data to be collected and used for the defense of discrimination claims while insulating against the optics of key decision-makers possessing this data for their consideration. Utilizing counsel for such data management also affords a measure of attorney-client privilege over communications with counsel surrounding the data when legal concerns over diversity and obstacles to various groups need to be discussed, and in the right circumstances, such practices may also afford work product protections over counsel&rsquo;s aggregation of such data. The ultimate takeaway though is that employers should be having conversations now about the proposed rule with their trusted employment counsel.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=1010th Circuit DEI holding remains faithful to established hostile work environment testhttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146408&format=xml15 Jun 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT:&nbsp;The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of an employee&rsquo;s hostile work environment claim under Title VII arising from his employer&rsquo;s DEI training program. The Court&rsquo;s opinion maintained the integrity of the established test for hostile work environment amid the recent war on employer DEI programs.<b><b><i><br /> </i></b></b></p> <div> <p><u>The Claim &ndash; <i>Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections</i>, No. 25-1068 (10th Cir. May 11, 2026)</u></p> <p>Plaintiff Joshua Young is a white man who was formerly employed by the Colorado Department of Corrections. His Complaint against his employer alleged that he experienced hostile work environment and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act due to his employer&rsquo;s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (&ldquo;DEI&rdquo;) training program. Mr. Young claimed that his employer&rsquo;s program made concerning generalizations about the role of white people in oppressing racial minorities. In conjunction with the training, there was a glossary of terms provided with general characterizations about white people in words such as &ldquo;race&rdquo;, &ldquo;white exceptionalism&rdquo;, and &ldquo;white fragility.&rdquo; Mr. Young claimed that department leaders were also advised to let less powerful people speak first and to treat employees differently based upon race. The training also included further video recommendations related to discriminatory housing and intersectionality. The Court had found variations of these same claims insufficient in Mr. Young&rsquo;s prior appeals; so, in this most recent rendition of his complaint at issue on appeal, Mr. Young further alleged the following:</p> <ol> <li>An ongoing commitment existed for this kind of training.</li> <li>Employees had to endorse the race-based ideology reflected in the training.</li> <li>Supervisors acted upon the training for disciplinary decisions.</li> <li>The training compromised security.</li> <li>The Department of Corrections failed to investigate his allegations.</li> </ol> <p>But did any of it affect a term, condition, or privilege of his employment? This was the determinative question the Court asked in deciding if Mr. Young had demonstrated a claim that could survive dismissal. The answer was a resounding &ldquo;no&rdquo;.</p> <p><u>The Law</u></p> <p>Traditionally, federal courts across the country have evaluated hostile work environment claims by determining whether the alleged hostile conduct permeated the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is &ldquo;sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim&rsquo;s employment and create an abusive working environment.&rdquo; Under the current administration, DEI programs have come under fire as potentially racially discriminatory, which has left employers and their attorneys facing uncertainty in traversing the Title VII minefield. The Court&rsquo;s opinion in Mr. Young&rsquo;s case, however, holds the line of established Title VII case law, providing encouragement for employers and their lawyers.</p> <p><u>The Holding</u></p> <p>The Tenth Circuit <a href="https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111433575.pdf">determined</a> that Mr. Young&rsquo;s burden was &ldquo;extremely high&rdquo; to allege facts that rendered his workplace &ldquo;overtly hostile&rdquo;. The Court held faithful to existing Title VII case law and determined that &ldquo;To cross this threshold, the training and its aftermath had to create an abusive working environment by altering a term, condition, or privilege of Mr. Young&rsquo;s job.&rdquo; Specifically, Mr. Young&rsquo;s allegations had to plausibly establish that the training to which he took offense affected his job responsibilities, interactions with fellow employees, or career advancement. Mr. Young failed to establish such an impact as the Court found that it was speculative that the training would be an ongoing obligation.</p> <p>Likewise, his various concerns about security, discipline, and others&rsquo; perception of him as racist had not materialized with sufficient factual support outside of his own subjective concerns. &nbsp;The Court also rejected his claim that his employer forced him to endorse the beliefs espoused in the training because the training expressly disclaimed that he needed to change his beliefs and encouraged employees to ask questions. Likewise, Mr. Young could not establish how his employer&rsquo;s failure to investigate his concerns impacted him. Because his hostile work environment claim failed, his constructive discharge claim also could not stand.</p> <p><u>Takeaways: How should employers navigate DEI training?</u></p> <p>While not addressed directly by the Tenth Circuit, the additional test by which courts traditionally measure whether an alleged hostile work environment is sufficiently &ldquo;severe or pervasive&rdquo; to be actionable is whether the Plaintiff&rsquo;s allegations are both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Essentially, courts look at whether the plaintiff actually and reasonably perceived the alleged events to be intimidating or hostile, and would the objectively reasonable person agree with them that the alleged events rendered the work environment permeated by hostility affecting their employment?</p> <p>As the <i>Young </i>opinion suggests, DEI training that is not ongoing or coercive and which lacks an articulable tangible impact on an employee&rsquo;s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, is unlikely to result in a successful hostile environment claim. While employers and attorneys should always remain sensitive to case law differences in their own jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit&rsquo;s opinion provides a measure of confidence in relying on traditional tests to measure relative legal compliance of DEI training programs with Title VII. Employers should take advantage of this much needed clarity to perform a risk of assessment of their own planned DEI training. &nbsp;In this endeavor, employers might consider the following 10-question checklist:</p> <ol> <li>How often is the employer providing training on DEI topics to its employees?</li> <li>Is the training mandatory?</li> <li>Are the training materials sufficiently sensitive to avoid stereotyping groups of people?</li> <li>Do employees know that they can ask questions, disagree, and challenge ideas?</li> <li>How does the employer design a training environment open to discussion and debate that remains respectful, comfortable, and safe for employees?</li> <li>Does the employer have a clear written policy regarding how and to whom employees can report concerns of harassment by other employees?</li> <li>Does the employer train employees and managers regarding its anti-harassment policy and expectations?</li> <li>In what ways might the DEI training program be inadvertently endorsing preferential treatment for certain groups of employees based on a protected characteristic?</li> <li>What is the legitimate business purpose of the DEI goals the employer wishes to achieve?</li> <li>How can the employer&rsquo;s DEI goals be met without making protected class the determinative factor in hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and other formal and informal privileges afforded to employees in the workplace?</li> </ol> The foregoing list is not legal advice, and it is by no means exhaustive nor guaranteed to prevent an employment claim regarding an employer&rsquo;s DEI training, but it provides a starting point for the robust conversation that should occur with counsel about an employer&rsquo;s specific situation. Employers are highly encouraged to consult counsel for assistance in reasonably tailoring and implementing their DEI programs.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Missouri Court Bars Arbitration for Failure to Include Mandatory Statutory Noticehttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=146319&format=xml29 May 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: The Missouri Court of Appeals (Eastern District) affirmed the trial court&rsquo;s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, where the arbitration agreement chose to apply Missouri&rsquo;s Uniform Arbitration Act (&ldquo;MUAA&rdquo;) but omitted the statute&rsquo;s mandatory boldface notice on the signature page about binding arbitration.</p> <div> <p><b>Key Facts </b></p> <p>In <i>Tri-Star Imports, Inc. d/b/a Mercedes-Benz of St. Louis v. Jackson Lewis, P.C., et al.</i>, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, <a href="https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=233495">affirmed</a> the trial court&rsquo;s refusal to compel arbitration of a legal malpractice claim against a law firm.</p> <p>The client retained the law firm in 2018 in connection with two hostile-work-environment matters. The engagement agreement contained an arbitration clause within a &ldquo;Dispute Resolution&rdquo; section, stating that arbitration &ldquo;shall be in accordance with the Uniform Arbitration Act of Missouri.&rdquo;</p> <p>After the client later filed a legal malpractice action, the firm moved to dismiss or stay and compel arbitration. Although the agreement referenced the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act (&ldquo;MUAA&rdquo;), the firm argued the Federal Arbitration Act (&ldquo;FAA&rdquo;) should govern because the representation involved interstate commerce, including out-of-state parties, work performed in Texas, and interstate communications and payments.</p> <p>The trial court denied the motion, finding the MUAA applied and the arbitration clause failed to comply with the MUAA&rsquo;s mandatory notice provision. The Eastern District affirmed.</p> <p><b>The Court&rsquo;s Holdings</b></p> <p><b>1. The MUAA Governed the Arbitration Clause</b></p> <p>The court acknowledged that the FAA generally governs arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. But it emphasized that parties may expressly agree to apply state arbitration law instead.</p> <p>Here, the agreement specifically stated that arbitration would proceed &ldquo;in accordance with&rdquo; the MUAA. Relying on Missouri precedent and the United States Supreme Court&rsquo;s decision in <i>Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University</i>, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), the court held that, when parties expressly agree to abide by state rules of arbitration, the FAA will not preempt enforcement and state law will govern, even when the contract involves interstate commerce.</p> <p><b>2. The Missing MUAA Notice Rendered the Clause Unenforceable</b></p> <p>Section 435.460 of the MUAA requires contracts subject to the statute to contain a conspicuous warning adjacent to or above the signature line stating:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">&ldquo;THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS A BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION WHICH MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE PARTIES.&rdquo;</p> <p>The warning must appear in ten-point, all-capital letters.</p> <p>The court found the required notice appeared nowhere in the engagement agreement. Because the statute uses mandatory language (&ldquo;shall&rdquo;), the court held the omission rendered the arbitration provision unenforceable.</p> <p><b>Why This Matters</b></p> <p><b><i>For Lawyers and Law Firms</i></b></p> <p>The case is an important drafting reminder. Parties typically don&rsquo;t choose to apply the state law arbitration statute over the FAA. But when an agreement expressly selects the MUAA, the statutory signature-page notice is mandatory.</p> <p>If the goal is to rely on the FAA, drafters should avoid language incorporating the MUAA unless they intend to comply with the Act&rsquo;s formal requirements.</p> <p>The opinion also contains an important ethical reminder. Although the court did not decide whether attorney-client agreements requiring arbitration of malpractice claims are enforceable generally, it specifically referenced Missouri lawyers&rsquo; professional obligations to ensure clients are fully informed about the scope and effect of arbitration provisions.</p> <p><b>For Businesses </b></p> <p>Many commercial agreements contain arbitration provisions selecting Missouri law. Businesses should review whether their agreements expressly invoke the MUAA and, if so, whether the required statutory notice appears in the proper location and format. Failure to comply with the statute may result in a court refusing to compel arbitration altogether.</p> <p><b>Practical Drafting Checklist</b></p> <p>When preparing Missouri arbitration agreements, consider the following:</p> <ul> <li>If the agreement invokes the MUAA, include the statutory warning immediately adjacent to or above the signature block in ten-point, all-capital letters.</li> <li>If the agreement is intended to be governed by the FAA, ensure the drafting consistently reflects that intent and does not incorporate the MUAA by reference.</li> <li>Provide a clear explanation of the arbitration provision, including the claims covered, forum selection, arbitrator qualifications, and allocation of costs and fees.</li> </ul> <p><b>Bottom Line</b></p> In Missouri, parties who choose the MUAA must also comply with its formal requirements. A missing statutory notice is enough to defeat arbitration entirely. Careful drafting at the outset can help prevent expensive and unnecessary disputes over enforceability down the road.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Missouri Federal Court Rejects Conditional Certification in FLSA Meal Break Casehttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=145768&format=xml06 Feb 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: A Missouri federal court declined to certify an FLSA meal break collective action where plaintiffs relied on potential interruptions rather than evidence of unpaid work.</p> <div> <p>On December 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri issued a decision that provides useful guidance for healthcare employers and wage-and-hour practitioners. In <i><a href="https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/missouri/moedce/4:2024cv00786/212469/52/0.pdf">Kaiser v. St. Luke&rsquo;s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospitals, Inc</a>.</i>, the court denied conditional certification of a proposed Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action alleging unpaid meal breaks for nurses and technicians.</p> <p>Even under the FLSA&rsquo;s lenient conditional certification standard, speculation and generalized theories are insufficient. <i>Kaiser</i> reinforces that plaintiffs must present evidence demonstrating a single, FLSA-violating compensation practice applicable to the proposed class.</p> <p><b>Background</b></p> <p>The plaintiff, a registered nurse, alleged that St. Luke&rsquo;s violated the FLSA by failing to compensate nurses and technicians for meal periods. According to the complaint, because employees remained responsible for patient care and could be interrupted during breaks, all unpaid meal periods were compensable work time under the FLSA.</p> <p>Like many healthcare employers, St. Luke&rsquo;s historically used an automatic 30-minute meal break deduction but later implemented an attestation process. That process allowed employees to override the deduction and receive pay for worked meal periods.</p> <p>The plaintiff sought conditional class certification under 29 U.S.C. &sect; 216(b), asserting that nurses and technicians were similarly situated because each meal break was &ldquo;subject to interruption.&rdquo;</p> <p><b>Legal Standard</b></p> <p>At the notice stage of an FLSA collective action, the court does not evaluate the merits of the claims; however, the plaintiff must still substantially allege that proposed members were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan that violated the FLSA. While courts do not weigh credibility or resolve factual disputes at this stage, they require more than unsupported assertions or statements lacking personal knowledge.</p> <p>In the Eighth Circuit, courts analyze unpaid meal break claims using the &ldquo;for-the-benefit-of-the employer&rdquo; standard. This standard is flexible and allows courts to consider different factors depending on the nature of the business involved. Under this framework, a meal period is compensable only if it is spent predominantly for the employer&rsquo;s benefit, rather than allowing the employee to use the time effectively for their own purposes.</p> <p><b>Denial of Conditional Certification</b></p> <p>The court rejected the plaintiff&rsquo;s theory that the mere <i>possibility</i> of interruption transforms an unpaid meal break into compensable work time. Relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, the court emphasized that it is neither realistic nor required under the FLSA for employers to compensate employees for meal periods during which they are relieved of duties except for being on call to respond to emergencies.</p> <p>The court highlighted several evidentiary gaps that proved fatal to the plaintiff&rsquo;s motion:</p> <ul type="disc"> <li><b>No evidence of meaningful restrictions.</b> There was no evidence that employees were required to remain on campus, stay in a specific location, or obtain permission to leave during meal breaks.</li> <li><b>No evidence of frequent interruptions.</b>&nbsp;The record lacked evidence showing how often interruptions occurred, if at all.</li> <li><b>Evidence of compliant policies.</b>&nbsp;The employer maintained a process allowing employees to receive compensation for meal breaks that they worked.</li> </ul> <p>The plaintiff showed only the possibility of interruption, which the court held was insufficient to establish that meal periods primarily benefited the employer.</p> <p>The court also distinguished a prior healthcare decision in which conditional certification was granted. In that case, the plaintiffs presented evidence that they were required to continuously provide patient care during unpaid meal breaks and were effectively unable to disengage from their duties. By contrast, the <i>Kaiser</i> plaintiff offered no evidence that St. Luke&rsquo;s knowingly required employees to work through meal periods without compensation. The existence of the attestation process further undermined any claim of a uniform, FLSA-violating practice.</p> <p><b>Key Takeaways for Employers</b></p> <p><i>Kaiser</i> reinforces several important principles:</p> <ul type="disc"> <li>Automatic meal break deductions are not <i>per se</i>&nbsp;unlawful under the FLSA</li> <li>On-call status, standing alone, does not make a meal break compensable</li> <li>Attestation and override processes matter, both for compliance and litigation defense</li> <li>Conditional certification can be defeated at an early stage when plaintiffs fail to present evidence of actual unpaid work</li> </ul> From a defense perspective, <i>Kaiser</i> serves as a reminder that conditional certification is discretionary, not automatic. Courts in the Eighth Circuit continue to require plaintiffs to present evidence tying their claims to a common, FLSA-violating practice. By developing the factual record early and pursuing targeted discovery, employers may avoid the issuance of notice, often the most costly and disruptive stage of an FLSA collective action. For employers facing meal break claims, <i>Kaiser</i> provides a useful roadmap for defeating certification before the case expands.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Seventh Circuit test for issuance of notice to prospective ADEA/FLSA collective plaintiffs balances employee and employer interests, offering employers a chance at pre-notice rebuttal evidencehttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=145689&format=xml22 Jan 2026Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: The Seventh Circuit held that in ADEA lawsuits, before the court may permit &ldquo;opt-in&rdquo; notice to a class of prospective plaintiff employees, plaintiffs must furnish evidence that prospective class members are &ldquo;similarly situated&rdquo; in that they were victims of a common illegal employment practice or policy, and defendants must have the opportunity to rebut that showing.</p> <div> <p><u>Background</u></p> <p>In actions under both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Fair Labor Standards Act, employees may bring a &ldquo;collective action&rdquo; claim on behalf of themselves and other employees similarly situated. Unlike a federal Rule 23(b)(3) class action, where a representative plaintiff&rsquo;s actions bind all class members unless they opt-out, these collective actions require that collective plaintiffs opt-in to participate and afford each plaintiff party status. Historically, Supreme Court precedent has permitted district courts to be involved in the issuance of notice to proposed classes of ADEA/FLSA collective plaintiffs on the justification that district courts have a managerial responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties.</p> <p>Traditionally, the Seventh Circuit&rsquo;s district courts have largely followed the &ldquo;<i>Lusardi </i>approach&rdquo; for court-issued notice which required a two-step analysis. At the first step, the plaintiff needed to make a &ldquo;modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.&rdquo; Generally, unless significant discovery had already occurred, this low burden was sufficient for the court to issue notice to the proposed collective class. Only then at step-two, <i>after</i> notice and opt-ins by the collective class, did most courts allow defendants the chance to move to sever the class by demonstrating the collective class of employees is not actually similarly situated. By this point, of course, the damage to employers was done, generating potential further lawsuits regardless of whether the plaintiffs were ultimately allowed to proceed with collective class status.</p> <p>Recently, multiple circuits have begun examining the plaintiff&rsquo;s burden before a Court can issue notice to a class of potential collective plaintiffs. Now, under <i>Richards v. Eli Lilly &amp; Co.</i>, the Seventh Circuit has joined the discussion. &nbsp;</p> <p><u>Richards v. Eli Lilly &amp; Co. </u></p> <p>In <i>Richards v. Eli Lilly &amp; Co.</i>, plaintiff Monica Richards was working as an interim District Sales Manager for one of Eli Lilly&rsquo;s sales teams for nearly six months when she applied for official promotion to that position. Ms. Richards was in her early fifties and had been with the company for six years. Despite her experience and already occupying the role, she was passed over for promotion in favor of a younger employee with less experience. Ms. Richards alleged that the denial of her promotion was based on a companywide initiative to support and retain &ldquo;Early Career Professionals&rdquo; with less than two years of postgraduate experience. Based on the alleged policy, Ms. Richards filed her claim and requested the District Court issue notice to a proposed collective class of &quot;Eli Lilly employees who were 40 or older when they were denied promotions for which they were qualified, since February 12, 2022.&quot; The District Court employed the <i>Lusardi</i> approach and found that Richards had made the requisite showing for notice to issue but certified an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit in an invitation for the Court to establish precedent for the standard to apply for a plaintiff&rsquo;s burden of proof to show such a collective class was &ldquo;similarly situated&rdquo; prior to notice.</p> <p>On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the tension between the competing interests of plaintiff employees and defendant employers. On one hand, plaintiffs have strong incentive to get notice issued to a collective class because it lowers individual cost to litigate, makes it easier to retain suitable counsel, and particularly creates settlement leverage against defendants; whereas, on the other hand, defendants have an interest in avoiding larger classes and the generation of new lawsuits regardless of whether new plaintiffs ultimately opt in or proceed with separate claims. The Seventh Circuit also articulated concerns about avoiding the appearance of the judiciary endorsing the lawsuits by issuing notice and the need to maintain flexible judicial discretion.</p> <p>To resolve these concerns, <a href="https://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/OpinionsWeb/processWebInputExternal.pl?Submit=Display&amp;Path=Y2025/D08-05/C:24-2574:J:Kirsch:aut:T:fnOp:N:3407082:S:0%20%5d">the Seventh Circuit charted a middle course</a>. The new approach rejected <i>Lusardi</i> as too lenient but treated the &ldquo;heightened burden&rdquo; and &ldquo;preponderance of the evidence&rdquo; standards adopted by sister Circuits as too strict. Similar to the standard on a motion for summary judgment, step-one of the Seventh Circuit&rsquo;s new standard now requires plaintiffs to make a threshold showing that there is a material factual dispute whether the proposed class collective is similarly situated, i.e., that the plaintiffs were victims of a common illegal employment practice or policy, before a class can be conditionally certified for notice by the court. Significantly, defendants are now also permitted to offer their rebuttal evidence <i>before </i>notice issues. However, the Court also recognized this may mean parties simply submit affidavits and counter-affidavits.</p> <p>What happens next after plaintiffs establish the existence of a factual dispute remains subject to judicial discretion. If the court believes the information needed to resolve the dispute is in the hands of the yet-to-be-noticed plaintiffs, it may still issue notice and follow a two-step approach to postpone final determination until after opt-in and discovery are complete. Here, plaintiffs would bear the burden at the second step to move to certify their class themselves and establish commonality by a higher &ldquo;preponderance of the evidence&rdquo; standard. (In a concurring opinion, one of the Seventh Circuit judges questioned this portion of the Court&rsquo;s analysis and stated that since this two-step process was not actually applied in this case, the Court should not have ruled on this point, and this part of the opinion was mere <i>dicta</i>, i.e., non-binding commentary. So there may be room for argument in future cases that this part of the Court&rsquo;s analysis was not binding precedent, and should be revisited.)</p> <p>Alternatively, a trial court may instead determine limited discovery would be sufficient at step-one to resolve the dispute before notice. However, in commentary that perhaps signaled the scales remain slightly tipped in favor of plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit also cautioned lower courts to consider that delays in notice for conducting discovery could jeopardize the potential expiration of the statute of limitations on FLSA claims for prospective plaintiffs.</p> <p><u>What does it mean for employers?</u></p> The outlook for employers under the Seventh Circuit&rsquo;s new standard is cautiously optimistic. The previously largely unavailable opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence that collective plaintiffs are not similarly situated <i>before</i> court-issued notice is a victory for defendant employers. However, since a plaintiff might demonstrate a material factual dispute by an affidavit attesting to some basis for their beliefs, the initial burden likely remains relatively low in practice. Courts reluctant to deny plaintiffs their day in court and fearful of running out the clock on prospective plaintiffs&rsquo; claims might also be predisposed to employ the two-step method and punt the final decision on commonality until later in the litigation rather than force plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery without the aid of information from prospective collective class members. Like summary judgment, how effective of a tool the new standard is in the defendant&rsquo;s arsenal will likely be a case-by-case basis and somewhat dependent on forum and judicial temperament.&nbsp;</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10Tenth Circuit upholds Summary Judgment for Defendant on a Hostile Work Environment Claim, Ruling that Muldrow Did Not Relax the Standard for Proving Such Claimshttps://www.bakersterchi.com/?t=40&an=145482&format=xml24 Nov 2025Employment & Labor Law Blog<p>ABSTRACT: The United States Army wins summary judgment on a male, civilian employee&rsquo;s complaints of a hostile work environment based on gender. The Tenth Circuit held that the actions were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.</p> <div> <p><u>Background</u></p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit <a href="https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111330491.pdf">affirmed</a> summary judgment in favor of the United States Army after a male, civilian Army employee brought claims of a hostile work environment claim. He alleged that a female supervisor treated him and other men in the supervisor&rsquo;s division with antagonism and contempt, constituting a hostile work environment based on gender for the purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p> <p>In <i>Russell v. Driscoll, </i>a plaintiff employee of the Irwin Army Community Hospital in Fort Riley, Kansas, alleged that his supervisor took steps motivated by gender bias. The plaintiff was the acting chief of the hospital&rsquo;s medical logistics division for a year and a half, when Major Tamara Tran was appointed the division chief. Plaintiff Paul Russell complained that he felt singled out by Major Tran, including: being publicly criticized for decisions he made as the acting chief; requiring him to change his email signature to a less prestigious title; removing him from leadership email distribution lists; copying other employees on emails about his personal financial matters in an attempt to embarrass him; and appointing a non-supervisory female employee as acting chief, a role which Russell believes should have gone to him.</p> <p>An internal investigation took place after complaints from logistics division employees about both Plaintiff Paul Russell and Major Tran. This investigation concluded that Major Tran was routinely discriminating on the basis of gender by holding gender-segregated meetings, assigning men and women different books to read, openly commenting on the lack of women in supervisory positions, and allowing women to meet with her without a prior appointment while requiring men to schedule ahead of time. The final investigative report cleared Russell of wrongdoing, and he brought suit.</p> <p>The Army was granted summary judgment by the District Court, which ruled the actions of Major Tran were not severe or pervasive enough to meet the legal standard for a hostile work environment claim. On appeal, Russell argued that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard in light of the Supreme Court&rsquo;s decision in <i>Muldrow v. City of St. Louis</i>.</p> <p>The Tenth Circuit addressed his argument that the <i>Muldrow</i> standard should apply. Under <i>Muldrow</i>, a plaintiff challenging his transfer to a new position need only show some change for the worse to the conditions of his employment and that the transfer must have left him in a worse position than before. Even though the <i>Muldrow </i>plaintiff retained her rank and pay upon transfer, the loss of perks and prestige met the threshold of a Title VII violation.</p> <p>However, here, Russell went further and argued that the <i>Muldrow </i>decision lowered the bar for hostile-environment claims, as it did for claims involving discrete acts. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the actions severity or pervasiveness must still be so bad they alter the material conditions of the plaintiff&rsquo;s employment.</p> <p>The Tenth Circuit did not find this to be the case for Russell, and explained that &ldquo;we do not believe the Supreme Court&rsquo;s hostile-environment decisions rest on reasons rejected in [<i>Muldrow</i>]. Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct . . . over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Indeed, precisely because not all workplace conduct that may be described as harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII, the complained-of conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim&rsquo;s employment and create an abusive working environment. If that standard is met, the hostile environment is itself the unlawful discriminat[ion] against [the victim] with respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.&rdquo;</p> <p>The Court acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit had reached an opposite conclusion in <i>McNeal v. City of Blue Ash</i>, 117 F.4th 887, 904 (6th Cir. 2024), where the court held that <i>Muldrow</i> applies to hostile-environment claims just as it does to discrete-act claims.&nbsp; But the Tenth Circuit firmly disagreed with that ruling.</p> <p><u>Practical Considerations</u></p> <p>Employers should be aware when work environments begin becoming hostile, cutting these issues off before they reach a boiling point. However, hostile work environments still must rise to the level of altering the conditions of employment for those complaining. If the smaller, individual actions which an employee alleges amount to a hostile work environment are not severe or pervasive enough to materially alter that employee&rsquo;s terms of employment, then that hostile work environment claim will not hold up under Title VII.</p> It is important to create and foster healthy work environments. If a work environment consists of actions and decisions which begin to affect the terms of an employee&rsquo;s employment, this will be enough to support a hostile work environment claim. Don&rsquo;t let it.</div>https://www.bakersterchi.com?t=39&anc=368&format=xml&directive=0&stylesheet=rss&records=10