Illinois Supreme Court Fails to Rein in Destructive Legislation Allowing Civil Claims Against Employers

Changes to the ODA and the Introduction of Exception 1.1

The Illinois Workers’ Occupational Disease Act (ODA) historically provided protections for employers by limiting employees' rights to sue for occupational diseases that developed after the completion of their employment. However, a shift in legislation occurred in 2019 with the amendment of the ODA and introduction of 820 ILCS 310/1.1 (“Exception 1.1”), which effectively stripped these protections away. The Illinois Supreme Court recently ruled on Exception 1.1’s application to the ODA and its constitutionality, dealing a blow to employers’ hopes that Exception 1.1 would be found unconstitutional due to violating employers’ constitutional due process. The Court’s ruling in Martin turned a blind eye as to Exception 1.1’s gutting of employers’ defenses under the ODA, particularly the exclusivity provisions that traditionally barred civil suits for occupational diseases once compensation benefits had been provided under the Act.

The introduction of Exception 1.1 via legislative amendment to the ODA in 2019 allowed employees whose claims were barred by certain periods of repose to bypass the exclusivity provisions of the ODA and file civil lawsuits instead. In March 2024, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit in Martin v. Goodrich Corporation sought clarification by the Illinois Supreme Court on three main points and referred the case to the Illinois Supreme Court to answer three certified questions. These included: (1) whether the temporal limitation in Section 1(f) of the ODA is a statute of repose, (2) whether applying Exception 1.1 violated Illinois’ constitutional due process, and (3) seeking the Court to define the temporal reach of Exception 1.1.

Legal Challenges and the Illinois Supreme Court’s Ruling

While the case was pending, numerous amicus briefs were filed with the court on behalf of employers’ interests, expressing concerns about how the new legislation could harm Illinois employers. They argued that Exception 1.1 could be manipulated by plaintiffs to bypass timing restrictions under the ODA and raised constitutional challenges about retroactively reviving extinguished claims.

In January 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled unanimously, turning its back on employers’ rights, rubber stamping Exception 1.1’s modification of the ODA. In answering the three certified questions before the Court, (1) it agreed that Section 1(f) of the ODA is a statute of repose under Exception 1.1; (2) the Court held that Exception 1.1 applied prospectively, though its definition of prospective application will not prevent employees from seeking compensation in civil court decades after their employment; and (3) that Exception 1.1 did not violate employers’ constitutional due process guarantees.

Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

In addressing the first certified question, the Illinois Supreme Court noted its prior decision from 2015 in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, where it had established Section 6(c) of the ODA as a statute of repose. The Martin Court viewed Exception 1.1 as a legislative correction of what it considered the harsh consequences of the outcome of Folta, and extended the same reasoning to Section 1(f) as it did for Section 6(c). The Court argued that because Section 1(f) limits an employer's liability after a certain time, it effectively serves as a statute of repose.

In response to the second question, the Court relied on Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, which dictates the temporal reach of legislative amendments. It concluded that Exception 1.1 was substantive in nature, as it allowed employees to file claims outside the scope of the ODA, and thus should apply prospectively. Even still, the parties disagreed on whether Exception 1.1 should apply prospectively, with the defense arguing that it should not apply to a plaintiff's claims stemming from exposure to a workplace hazard in 1976 as the defendants had gained a vested right to assert the defenses and exclusivity provisions of the ODA that existed at that time in 1976. Additionally, the defense argued that applying Exception 1.1 to previously barred claims would violate constitutional due process rights. In response, the Court addressed the final certified question to clarify the meaning of applying Exception 1.1 prospectively.

As to the question of whether Exception 1.1 violates constitutional due process protections of employers, the Court held that the right to an employer’s defense based on the exclusivity provisions of the ODA does not vest until the employee’s claim accrues, which, in this case, was after the employee was diagnosed with the occupational disease, which occurred after Exception 1.1 was enacted. Therefore, the Court ruled that applying Exception 1.1 did not violate the due process rights of the employer.

Despite the concerns raised by the defense and numerous amicus briefs, the Illinois Supreme Court left the task of addressing public policy issues related to Exception 1.1 to the legislature, suggesting that any changes or refinements would need to be made through further legislative action, rather than through judicial intervention.

Impact on Employers and Future Considerations