Chemical Flavoring Case Leaves A Bitter Aftertaste: Missouri Court Upholds $56.6 Million Punitive Damages Award Against Flavoring Giant
ABSTRACT: The Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals upholds trial court’s $58 million judgment against Givaudan Flavor Corp., with $56.6 million being awarded in punitive damages.
Givaudan Flavor Corp (“Givaudan”) manufactures chemical flavoring products and sells them to food production companies. General Mills purchased Givaudan’s diacetyl and/or 2,3-pentanedione buttery flavoring for its products. Graham was an employee at General Mills food manufacturing plant in Hannibal, Missouri, from 2005 through 2011. During that time, General Mills purchased seventeen Givaudan flavors, which contained diacetyl and/or 2,3-pentanedione. Graham alleged the exposure to diacetyl and/or 2,3-pentanedione caused him to contract bronchiolitis obliterans. At trial, a jury awarded Graham $2 million in compensatory damages and assessed $56.6 million in punitive damages against Givaudan.
On April 7, 2026, the Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals issued an opinion finding no errors in the jury verdict award of $2 million in compensatory damages or the $56.6 million award in punitive damages. The $2 million award was later reduced to $1.5 million by settlements from other parties previously in the case.
Givaudan claims on appeal that Graham’s experts, Dr. Finkel and Dr. Pue, were wrongfully allowed to testify. Givaudan first challenged the reliability of Finkel’s opinions on general causation and Graham’s exposure to the toxic ingredients. Specifically, Givaudan argued his opinions were unreliable because Finkel was not a “Flavor Scientist.” The panel found Finkel’s tenure as the chief scientist for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and Finkel’s more than forty peer-reviewed articles on epidemiology, toxicology, and risk assessment was enough for him to give qualified expert opinions on this matter. The panel further held an expert’s skill, experience, training, and education are far more important than a label.
The panel further rejected Givaudan’s argument regarding Finkel’s testimony on his standard of care, stating Givaudan failed to mention in its brief the offending testimony by Finkel. The panel noted the court may review the entirety of the transcript but cannot make inferences of what would be deemed “offending” according to Givaudan. The panel said such an exercise would make it an advocate for Givaudan, which it cannot be. Givaudan failed to do such, and the panel said it would not do the company’s work for them.
As for Dr. Pue, Givaudan stated Pue’s method of a differential diagnosis was unreliable. By using the differential diagnosis, Pue took all scientifically plausible causes of Graham’s injuries and began to rule out the least plausible until the most likely remains. Pue’s findings showed Graham’s bronchiolitis was caused by the exposure to diacetyl and/or 2,3-pentanedione, which was found in Givaudan’s flavoring. While stating Pue’s methods were reliable, the panel said if Givaudan wanted to challenge Pue’s method, it would go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
Next, Givaudan argued the trial court erred by excluding all evidence of non-party chemical flavoring present at the General Mills’ plant. The panel stated this was an incorrect assertion as the circuit court allowed evidence that over ten million pounds of chemical flavoring were used at the plant. Givaudan’s own briefing mentioned the court allowing evidence of nonparty chemicals, and, as such, the panel rejected this argument.
The panel also said the trial court correctly excluded Givaudan’s evidence about cigarette smoke. The three studies Givaudan presented showed certain brands of cigarettes contain diacetyl and/or 2,3-pentanedione but fail to show the causal link to bronchiolitis obliterans. The panel was confused by Givaudan’s argument as it oscillated between suggesting the circuit court erred because the studies showed the relevant ingredients do not cause bronchiolitis obliterans and that the court erred by excluding the evidence to show cigarette smoke could have caused Graham’s injuries. The panel rejected this argument by stating, “Being as Givaudan seems confused by its own experts’ testimony, it is unclear how a jury would fare better.”
Givaudan also argued Graham did not make a submissible case. Givaudan lumped several separate points on appeal, each of which involved different elements and different legal standards, into this one argument. The panel said Givaudan’s attempt to shoehorn those arguments into a single point made it lose its legal coherence and was therefore rejected.
The panel also upheld the trial court’s $56.6 million dollar award for punitive damages by pointing at the evidence that Givaudan was aware diacetyl was toxic in 1985 and knew it found cases of bronchiolitis obliterans in workers in the mid-1990s but did not disclose it to its customers. In 2007 Givaudan told its customers of the issues with diacetyl and would provide more details “upon request” even though it was legally required to provide information without the request.
In 2007, General Mills requested Givaudan remove diacetyl. Givaudan replaced diacetyl with 2,3-pentanedione, which plaintiff argued was as toxic, if not more so, and Givaudan was aware of this fact. Givaudan did not place warning labels on its products until 2019.
The panel found Givaudan’s conduct “reprehensible,” citing Givaudan’s knowledge of the toxicity of its products and its unwillingness to modify its business practices. Thus, the panel believed punitive damages were appropriate. Givaudan argued the compensatory damage amount should mitigate the liability for punitive damages, but the panel rejected this argument by citing several cases where much higher compensatory and punitive damages were awarded in similar cases.
Givaudan also argued that the punitive damages award should be reduced because Graham’s condition was stable and he did not suffer from a latent injury. The panel rejected this argument, noting that the seriousness of Graham’s injuries did not mitigate Givaudan’s liability for punitive damages. The panel also explained that while there may be some circumstances in which an injury’s latency is relevant to a punitive damage award amount, that was not the case in Graham. In doing so, the panel recited Graham’s symptoms and the effect bronchiolitis obliterans had on him.
The panel also concluded the punitive damages amount was fair given the company’s net worth, saying the point of punitive damages is to be so great that it dissuades another company from conducing similar behavior.
Practical Considerations:
Key takeaways from this opinion would be the Missouri courts’ stance on experts and their opinions. A court will give more deference to an expert’s skill, experience, training and education and focus less on job titles or labels. Further, an expert brought in to refute a plaintiff’s expert should bolster one’s defense, not undermine its argument or provide confusing theories to a jury. In Graham, the defendant’s experts appeared unable to articulate the relevance of cigarette smoke.
Regarding punitive damages, if a judgment holds a business liable for punitive damages, the business should be made aware its past behaviors will be brought into the damage calculation as well as the business’s net worth to determine a proportionate punitive damages amount. Defendants in product liability and toxic exposure also should be aware that the nature or severity of the plaintiff’s injuries may not be a sufficient basis for reducing a punitive damages award.related services
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