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Washington Court of Appeals clarifies and tightens the standard for expert admissibility in unpublished case.

ABSTRACT: In a recent case, Cundy v. BNSF, Washington’s Court of Appeals clarified admissibility of expert opinions in Washington. An expert opinion must pass both Frye and ER 702. Frye analyzes the validity of the underlying science, while ER 702 analyzes the reliability of the expert. This two-step analysis moves Washington closer to the more rigorous federal Rule 702.

Washington is part of a minority of jurisdictions that still adheres to the Frye test for expert witnesses. Under the Frye test, an expert’s opinion is admissible if it enjoys “general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” The purpose of this test is to determine whether novel scientific evidence has a valid scientific basis.

To be admissible in Washington courts however, an expert’s opinion must also comply with Washington Evidence Rule (ER) 702. ER 702 is similar but not identical to the federal rule 702 governing expert admissibility.[1] Washington’s ER 702, which applies to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” (i.e., expert testimony), makes such testimony admissible if it “assist[s] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Stated simply, under ER 702, expert testimony is admissible if “helpful” to the jury (or the court in a bench trial) to understand the evidence or decide a relevant fact question. To be “helpful,” an opinion must be reliable in that it rests on scientific or other technical evidence, not speculation or belief.

The Cundy case, which is unpublished, shows what this two-step analysis looks like in practice. The Court in that case evaluated the admissibility of a plaintiff’s expert who had authored an opinion which stated that the plaintiff’s colon cancer was caused by years of working around diesel engine exhaust. The expert’s opinion was based on a review of scientific literature, epidemiological studies, and data related to the carcinogenic effects of diesel exhaust as well as the Bradford Hill criteria (a method of determining medical causation), and differential diagnosis.

First, the Court held that the expert’s opinion was not subject to a Frye challenge because its methodology was not “novel.” Literature review, the Bradford Hill criteria, and differential diagnoses are all well-established methods in the medical community. That is enough to pass the Frye test.

However, Division III nevertheless upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the opinion because the expert systematically misrepresented what the science said about diesel exhaust causing colorectal cancer. It was evident based on the record that the expert misstated the conclusions of various studies, cherry-picked data, applied peer-supported studies about lung and bladder cancer to plaintiff’s colorectal cancer, dismissed evidence of plaintiff’s smoking, and failed to apply the methodologies he said he did. The Court explained that these were challenges to the expert’s reliability, not the underlying scientific methods he said he employed, and therefore implicated ER 702 but not Frye.

The importance of this opinion, while unpublished, should not be understated. The reliability analysis above moves Washington’s standard for admission of expert testimony, which has long been flexible, closer to the more rigorous standard in Fed. R. Evid. 702 which explicitly incorporates an analysis of whether the expert’s testimony is “the product of reliable principles and methods” (Fed. R. Evid. 702(c)) and “reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case” (Fed. R. Evid. 702(d)). To the extent the Cudy court’s analysis is adopted by other divisions of Washington’s court of appeals or, ultimately, the state Supreme Court, this will move Washington’s standard for expert testimony further away from “junk science” and toward a more rigorous scientific or technical analysis already incorporated in Federal law.

[1] Under the most recent amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 702, that rule and not common law decisions like Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms. generally governs admissibility of experts in federal court.