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Court Issues Second Ruling on Illinois Credit Card Fee Capping Law: Out-of-State Banks Exempt, Credit Unions Not So Lucky

ABSTRACT: As promised, a second Order issued by the Judge in this case determines whether an Illinois state law restricting credit card fees and use of transaction data is preempted by the Federal Credit Union Act (“FCUA”) and 12 U.S.C. Section 1831a(j) which regulate credit unions and out-of-state banks. The Court had already issued an Order in the case on December 20, 2024, that the National Banking Act preempts the Illinois law, however nothing preempts major card networks, like Visa and Mastercard, from compliance with the law.

INTRODUCTION

The Court in the U.S District Court for Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division issued a second Order in the case Illinois Bankers Association et al. v. Kwame Raou ruling that the Interchange Fee Prohibition Act (“IFPA”), an Illinois state law restricting credit card fees and transaction data, is preempted by 12 U.S.C. Section 1831a(j) which regulates out-of-state banks, however the IFPA is not preempted by the Federal Credit Union Act (“FCUA”).

The new Order stems from Plaintiffs’ suit to enjoin implementation of the IFPA arguing it is preempted by various federal laws. The result of which being a December 20, 2024 Order from the Court ruling IFPA preemption by the National Bank Act (“NBA”) and the Homeowners Credit Loan Act (“HOLA”), however the major card networks, such as Visa and Mastercard, had no valid claims of preemption. For more details on the court’s initial ruling, read our blog article of the first order [here].     

FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ACT

Plaintiffs argue IFPA is preempted by various FCUA terms authorizing credit unions to loan, contract and issue lines of credit to its members. Additionally, FCUA language states the Act preempts “any state law purporting to limit or affect” credit union loans and lines of credit. The Court discusses various types of preemption, however, ultimately analyze the client claims as a conflict. The standard for “conflict” preemption is that “it would be impossible…to comply with both state and federal law or when state law constitutes and “obstacle”. Finally, they argue the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) has the exclusive authority to regulate rates, repayment and other terms of repayment. The Court rejects these arguments stating simply the IFPA regulates credit union’s ability to collect fees on credit and debit card transactions from merchants, while the FCUA preemption statute regulates fees charged to members for initial lines of credit. The Court concludes Plaintiff failed to demonstrate it would likely prevail on its claim for IFPA preemption by FCUA.

12 U.S.C. SECTION 1831A(J)(1)

Plaintiffs also claim part of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (“RIBBE”) preempts IFPA. The RIBBE simply requires application of state law to out-of-state banks be equal to that of national banks in that state. Since the Court already ruled NBA preemption of IFPA for national banks in Illinois, RIBBE requires the same treatment as to out-of-state banks. The plain language of the statute supported this interpretation as well as prior case law interpreting RIBBE. Therefore, the Court concluded out-of-state banks would likely prevail on their preemption claim under RIBBE and enjoined application of IFPA as to those banks.

CONCLUSION

This Court likes to “split the baby” by applying preemption of IFPA to different financial institutions, involved in the same transactions, in separate orders and issued at different times in the case. Interpreting and applying preemption this way makes an already confusing area of the law even more so.  It may be intellectually honest to just apply the law and let the chips fall where they may. At some point, my hope is a practical and uniform approach is adopted by Courts in applying preemption to these types of state law seeking to eliminate excessive fees. Perhaps Congress could act by limiting fees charged to consumers for everyday and necessary services provided by businesses in markets dominated by a few large institutions which provide consumers little to no real choice with whom they do business with.