Missouri Supreme Court Vacates Verdict Against School Bus Company, Citing Intervening and Superseding Cause

Minor Plaintiff was using the student transportation services contracted through his elementary school and Defendant when he was hit by a third-party vehicle. Defendant’s substitute bus driver extended the stop arm and activated the school bus’s flashing lights; however, irrespective of these warnings, a third-party vehicle maneuvered around the bus and struck Plaintiff as he crossed the street.

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant for negligence, arguing in Count I that Defendant negligently dropped off minor Plaintiff at an unreasonably safe location, and in Count II that Defendant failed to provide the substitute driver with a route sheet, failed to advise the substitute driver of the content of the route sheet, and failed to tell the substitute driver the location of minor Plaintiff’s home.

Jury Trial and Verdict

At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant on Count I and in favor of Plaintiff on Count II. Defendant appealed, arguing that Plaintiff failed to show proximate cause because the criminal action of the hit and run driver was an intervening and superseding incident, and ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court accepted the case for review.

Legal Standard for Negligence and Proximate Cause

For negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was an “actual cause” or “cause-in-fact” to his injury. Once “actual cause” is shown, the question becomes whether the harm resulted from the reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. Although the sufficiency of the evidence for actual cause is a factual question reserved for the jury, a preliminary question of law may remain for the Court to determine. That is, where it has been alleged by the defendant that a third party’s action was a superseding or intervening cause of the injury, it is the role of the trial court to analyze whether it was the defendant’s conduct, or a superseding or intervening event, which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. In this case, the facts concerning the criminal acts of the hit-and-run-driver were not in dispute. In other cases where intervening cause has been alleged, the jury may be called upon to resolve fact questions about the third party’s conduct.

Missouri Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Supreme Court explained that an intervening cause is a new and independent force that interrupts the chain of events so much so “that it becomes the responsible, direct, proximate, and immediate cause of the injury.” The intervening cause eliminates liability for the defendant as a matter of law.

In reversing the trial court verdict for Plaintiff on Count II, the Missouri Supreme Court found that the third-party hit-and-run driver’s actions were a superseding and intervening cause, destroying the chain of causation. It reasoned that the driver’s hit-and-run action amounted to a felony and that the conduct of maneuvering around a school bus was “surprising, unexpected, or freakish,” “exceeding ‘the natural and probable consequences of [the] defendant’s actions.’” It also opined that this reasoning was supported by public policy because school bus drivers are required to follow strict instruction and statutory mandates to alert other drivers of the processes of loading and unloading students in order to drastically reduce the likelihood that a third-party driver will attempt to pass and strike a child. The intervening action of this third party was of no consequence to defendant’s conduct and was an intervening cause.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Wilson dissented, arguing that while a criminal action is seldom foreseeable, the risk that a third-party vehicle would maneuver around the stopped school bus and strike a child at an intersecting cross walk was not only foreseeable but was the risk that Defendant foresaw in undertaking specific design routes and policy manuals. His opinion focused on the substitute driver’s mistake in releasing Plaintiff at the wrong location, contending that if the substitute had released Plaintiff at the proper stop, he would not have had to travel in front of the bus, which was labeled to be a dangerous action in Defendant’s policy manual. Thus, the principal opinion crossed the line reserved for the finder of fact.

Key Takeaway